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IN 1HE SUPREME COURT OF 1HE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
Oase No. 9948 
-vs.-
.JKAN SINCLAIR, 
Defendamt. 
In the matter of the contempt of LaRae Peterson 
APPELLANT LaRAE PETERSON'S BRIEF 
Appeal from a contempt citation rendered against 
Ln.Rat' Peterson by the Honorable Marcellas K. Snow, 
Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
STATE~IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal contempt citation rendered by 
the Honorable Marcellas K. Snow, Judge of Third Dis-
trict Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
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against LaRae Peterson for refusal to answer a certain 
question propounded by the prosecutor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURJT 
The lower court found LaRae Peterson in contempt 
for the refusal to answer the question hereafter set out 
and sentenced said LaRae Peterson to serve five days 
in the County Jail and set bond appeal at $100.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
LaRae Peterson seeks reversal of the Lower Court's 
finding of contempt. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jean Sinclair, D·efendant in the main a.ction, was 
charged with murder in the First Degree. It was alleged 
·that she killed one Donald Foster on January 4, 1962, 
in Salt L1ake: County, State of Utah. During the course 
of the trial LaRae Peterson was called as a state witness. 
The prosecution, after a lengthy direct-examination pro-
pounded the following questions: 
Mr. Ba.niks : "I believe at the close of the last 
session we had an unanswered question. Would 
the reporter please read the last question." 
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Reporter Tiending: "\Veil, I'll put it this way 
then. Have you had any homosexual acts with 
Jean or she with you~" (R-1) 
LaRae Peterson: "vV ell, I refuse to answer 
on the grounds that it would tend to incriminte 
and degrade me." (R-2) 
The lower court ordered the witness to answer the 
qtw~tion stating: 
T·he Court: "Yes, Mrs. Peterson, the court 
feels that tmder these circumstances the way the 
question is asked and in connection with the legal 
ramifications involved, that this privilege is not 
claimable by you at this time under these circum-
stanes. And therefore, the court orders you to 
answer the question." (R-2) 
Counsel for Miss Peterson noted his acception. (R-
~) The question was repeated and the witness still re-
fus~d to answer the question. (R-2, 3) 
After the case in main had he·en submitted to the jury 
for its deliberations the lower court found LaRae Peter-
80n on criminal contempt and sentenced her to five days 
in jail. From said order, the witness takes this appeal. 
POINTS ARGUED FOR REVERSAL 
The Court erred in holding the witness for contempt 
for refusing to ans·wer the que·stion concerning homo-
8exual arts "ith the defendant. 
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In .analyzing the point on appeal,. the. C€lurt's atten-
tion is called to the following statutory language·: 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment -
" ... nor shall be compelled to in any criminal 
case to he .a witness against himself ... " 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12-
". . . 'The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself ... " 
Utah Code Annotated,. (1953 as amended) 78-24-
9: 
"A witness must answer questions Iegal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, though his answer 
may establish a claim against himself; but he need 
not give an answer which will have a tendency to 
subject him to punishment for felony; nor need 
he give an answer which will have a direct ten-
dency to degrade his character, unless it is to the 
very fruct in issue or to a fact from which the fact 
in issue would be presumed. But .a witness must 
answer as to the fact if his previous conviction 
for a felony." 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended}, 77-53-
22: 
"Every person who is guilty of sodomy or any 
other detestable and abominable crime against 
nature, committed with mankind or any with any 
animal with either the sexual organs or the mouth, 
is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison 
not less than 3 years, nor more than 20 years. 
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The position of this appeal can be stated, in its most 
simple tenns, in the following proposition, to wit: That 
the wi hH'~~, LaRae Peterson, had the legal right to claim 
the privilege, .as outlined in the above statutes, on the 
particular question propolmded to her inquiring as her 
"homosexual acts" with the defendant on the ground that 
said question would fall within the meaning of the law 
cited in Utah Code Annotated, 77-53-22. 
To have been required to answer the question would 
have had a tendency to subject the witness for the punish-
ment of a felony, to wit: A violation of Section 76-53-22. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Prior to 1923, the Utah Statut~ read as follows : 
"Every person who is guilty of the infamous 
crime .against nature, committed with mankind 
or with any animal is punishable . " Comp. 
Law, Utah, 1917. 
This statute was held to be declarative of the com-
mon law .and consequently did not include any acts which 
were not deen1ed sodomy in common law. State v. 
J ohn.son, ±! Utah 18, 137 Pac 632 ( 1913). Copulation per 
os was held not included in common l.aw crime of sodomy 
and thus not within the purview of the sodomy statute. 
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In discussing common law definition of the infamous 
crime against nature, court cites Wharton's Crminal Law 
(11th Ed.), 8ec. 754 wherein the author notes that "under 
the present doctrine, modification of common law doc-
trine is largely due to the broadening of the tenus by 
legislative enactments rather .than by judicial construc-
tion. Many of these statutes designate the offense as 
'crime against nature' or 'detestable and abominable 
crime against nature ... ' whether with man or beast." 
P.633. 
'The Utah statute was amended in 1923 to read as it 
does presently. The amendment of this statute has signi-
ficance in that the statute is no longer restricted to those 
.acts deemed sodomy at common law. State v. Peterson, 
81 Utah 340, 17 P. 2nd, 92·5, (19·33), wherein a motion 
to quash the information was denied by this Court. The 
information stated ·the act of fellatio and cunnilingus and 
this Court, speaking through Justice Elias D:ay, stated: 
"It is clear, however, by the language used 
by the legislature in the 1923 amendment that the 
law making power of this state desired to extend 
the ·acts which constitute the infamous crime 
.agains~t nature to include copulation in the mouth. 
Nor was it necessary for the legislature to specify 
the particular acts which should constitute the 
crime agains~t nature. That crime being iknown to 
the common law, the courts may resort to that 
source for .a definition of the crime and then give 
effe·ct to the legislative provision that the crime 
against nature is none the less such ·a crime when 
accomplished with the mouth." (Court cites cases). 
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"Our statute relating to the crime against 
nature as runended in 1923 is not open to the con-
stnlction that it includes only the crime of sodomy 
as known to the common law." (P. 926) 
This decision has support from other jurisdictions. 
In the case of State v. Milne, R. I. 187 A 2nd, 136, (1962) 
(appeal pending U.S. Supreme Court) the Court con-
~t nw<l a statute similar to theo one which is here involved 
and the Court stated: 
"Authorities hold that where the crime 
against nature is made criminal by statute the 
legislature is to be given a broad and comprehen-
sive construction so as to include within the pro-
hibition thereof unnatural copulation in all its 
forms. In other words, the generality of the pro-
hibition of statutes of this kind is significant of a 
legislative intent to bring within the thrust of 
such legislation all unnatural acts of copulation 
involving either man or beast and including sodo-
my." (P. 138.) 
Also, Berryman v. State, ______ Okla. Crim. ______ , 283 
P. 2nd, 558, ( 1955) wherein the Court stated: 
"\Ye emphasize again that our statute does 
not mention the word sodomy, but punishes the 
'abominable and detestable crime against nature' 
which includes not only sodomy as defined by 
common la-w, but all unnatural sexual copulation." 
(Appeal dismissed, 76 S. Ct. 141, 350 U.S. 878, 100 
L.Ed.) 
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Murray v. State, 236 Ind. 688, 143 N.E. 2d 290, (1957) 
wherein court cites with .approval from Sanders v. State, 
216 Ind. 663, 25 N.E. 2nd 995, (1940) where court said: 
''iThe statute in this State defines the crime 
as 'the abominabJe and detestable crime against 
nature with mankind or beast.' This Court has 
held in common with the Courts of other jursdic-
tions under similar statutes that the statutory 
definition includes both common law sodomy and 
acts of brutal chara;cter whereib;y degraded and 
perverted sexual deJSires are sought to be gratified 
contrary to nature." 
Further, the Court in Connell v. State, 215 Ind. 318, 
19 N.E. 2nd, 267, (19'39) stated that the crime may be 
committed between man and woman, as well as persons 
of the same sex, as '·'mankind" includes woman. Also, see, 
LeFavor v. State, 77 Old., C.R. 383, 142 Pac. 2nd 132, 
(1943). 
Thus, it would appear that under the present atti-
tude of this court, which is in keeping with the better 
reasoned authorities in other jurisdiction, that the Utah 
Statute is not limited to the strict common law crime of 
Sodomy, but is extended to all unnatural sexual relations 
between persons of the same sex. ExParte De Folfd, 14 
Okl. C.R. 133, 168 P. 58 (19'17). St.at.e v. Whitmarsh, 26 
S.D. 426, 128 N.W. 580 (1910). Hern'ng v. St,ate, 119 Ga. 
711, 46 S.E. 876, (1904). Johnson v. State, 380 P2d 289 
(1963). 
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The quP8tion which the witness refused to answer 
dealt with .. homo8Pxual acts." The case law in defining 
this t~·pf' of act is of no assistance. Nor is the statutory 
law .. See Robert Veit Shersin, Sex and the Statutory 
Law, p. 7. This tennis broad and may extend from the 
mere acts of affection to acts calculated to arouse the 
pnrient interest of the actors with the aim of sexual 
satisfaction. • Due regard to the sentiments of decent 
humanity prevents· any description of the latter acts 
which would f.all within realm and meaning of a:bomin-
nhle and detestaJble acts against nature. Suffice it to say 
that if the judge can say that the answer may tend to 
convict the witness and on that account refuses to an-
~wPr, and the court can imagine any state of facts under 
which the answer might lead to such result, the witness 
may insist on the protection of the law and refuse to 
answer. (In Re Tappen, 9 I-Iow. Proc. 395 (--------------------) ). 
Concededly, that while the proposition stated in the 
above case is not in the language found in the subsequent 
decisions, the writer states that it represents a realistic 
approach to the particular problem at hand. 
The latter decisions on this point have altered the 
above rule by stating when it reasonably appears that 
the answer will have a tendency to expose the witness to 
penal liability or to any kind of punishment or to a 
criminal charge, the witness need not answer. (Greenleaf 
EY., Sec. 451, Wharton's Crime Ev. (9th Ed.), p. 466). 
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The better reasoned rule is expressed in H offmarn 
v. U. S., 341 U.S.. 479, 91 L. Ed. 1118, 71 S. Ct. 814 (1951) 
wherein the Court stated that it need only be evident 
from the implications of the questions in the setting in 
which it is asked that a responsive .answer to the ques-
tion might be dangerous be'Cause injurious disclosure 
could result. 
Although the Utah statute states that a witness "need 
not give an .answer which will have a tendency to subject 
him to punishment for .a felony," U.C.A. (1953) 78-24-5, 
our court herd that this clause was general and gives 
pro·tection to a witness against giving an .answer in any 
event which will have a tendency to subject him to punish-
ment for crime. See In Re: SadleiYr 97 Uath 2'91, 85 P2d 
810 (1938) wherein the court stated: 
"We think this is the sense in which the word 
'felony' is used in this section, notwith.st,anding 
the fact the statutes divide crimes into two classes 
~felonies and misdemeanors (R-S.U. 1933, 103-1-
12) ." p. 812. 
Thus, this court in de·ciding the question here on 
appe-al is not restricted to the felonies, hut also must 
consider as to whether an inquiry as to "homosexual 
acts" may h.ave a tendency to subject the witness to the 
punishment of any crime. ·To this purpose, the court's 
attention is called to Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-1-17 
wherein "indeeent and immoral conduct" is punishable 
as a misdemeanor. 
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The appellant's position would clearly fall within 
the purview of the statutes above indicated. Homosexual 
ad~ would necessarily include acts wherein the erotic 
SPn~e~ are ·aroused and satisfied, and where two women 
are concerned, any such acts would constitute unnatural 
copulation. Clearly, homosexual acts need not include 
that type of conduct, however, "homosexual experiences" 
did include those acts described in St.ate v. Larsen, 83 
R C. 1307 377 P2d 1 ( 19·59) rehearing denied April, 1959, 
involving two adult males performing fellatio on e'ach 
other. This case further indicated that said act is within 
the prohibition despite the fact that no copulation was 
achieved. This case does appear to be illustrative of the 
type of act which would fall within the meaning of "homo-
sexual act" and consequently subject the witness, at bar, 
to the punishment of a crime. The difference of the 
gender can be of no significance. A stronger case is found 
in People v. M,anigus, 119 Cal. App. 2d 753, 260 P2d 137 
(1953) where the court, without describing the "repulsive 
details'' affirmed the convicti'on of an act, involving the 
defendant and another woman lying naked on a bed, of 
copulating mouth of one person with the sexual organ 
of another. Further the court's attention is called to 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) (as amended) 76-1-2 where-
in the common law rule of strict construction on criminal 
statutes is rendered inapplicable and the statutes are to 
be construed according to the fair import of their terms 
with a view to effect the objects of the statute ·and pro-
mote justice. 
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The general rule that the privilege against self in-
crimination and consequent re.fusal to answe·r the ques-
tion put to the witness is applicable in this instance. 
This privilege must be upheld where it appears from the 
question asked that a responsive answer or exp1anation 
of the claim of privilege involve a disclosure dangerous 
to the witness but the privilege is confined to real danger 
and does not e·xtend to remote possibilities out of ordin-
ary course of law. Hoffman v. U.S., (~upra). Blau v. 
U.S. 71 S. Ct. 223, 340 U.S. 159, 95 1 Ed 170 (1950). 
The question propounded by the District Attorney 
as to "homosexual acts" cannot be considered as a ques-
tion which is innocent on its face. U.S. v. Rosen., C.A. 
N.Y. 174 F 2d 187 (1949) cert denied 70 S. Ct. 87, 338, 
U.S. 851, 9'4 L. Ed. 521. People v. Schultz, 312 Ill. App. 
220, 38 N.E. 2d 379, (1941) affirmed 380 Ill. 539, 44 N.E. 
2d 601, nor need the witness prove a precise danger so 
long as his answer is likely or has a tendency to be 
dangerous to him. In Re Friedman C.D.C. N.Y. 104 F. 
Supp. 419 ( 19·52). 
·The basic problem of the court is how properly to 
afford full protection to the witness. and at the same time 
prevent simulated excuses. Thus, if it appears that rea-
sonable grounds exist for the witness to apprehend dan-
ger, or the inquire is found to be pregnant with danger, 
great latitude must be afforded the witness in determin-
ing what questions may be dangerous for him to answer, 
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or tlw effect of a particular question. K~eweh v. U. S., 
C. A. Minn., 204 F. 2nd 1, (1953). Commonwealth Ex Rel, 
f!:...;ft.,.rne l'. Esterline, 181 Pa. Super, 532, 124 A 2nd 
1:~:3 (1956) and any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
the witness. U. S. v. DiCarlo, D. C. Ohio, 102, F. Supp. 
;)!)7, (1952) U. S. v. Nesmith, D. C. 121 F. Supp. 758, 
( 1 !);)-! ). Mumford v. Croft, 8 Terry 464, 93 A 2d 506 
(1952). 
·The caution to be exhibited by the trial court in 
these types of cases is clearly explainable through the 
fact that even if a question is at first sight an innocent 
one, it may require an answer which will constitute a linik 
in the chain of evidence leading to the· conviction of the 
witness. Brunrner v. U. S., C. A. Cal reversed on other 
grounds 72 S. Ct. 674, 343 U. S. 918, 96 1 Ed. 1331. Com. 
r. F1~·dwr, 398 PA 239, 157 A 2nd 207 (1960), 98 C.J.S. 
Sec. -4-5-!. p. 303. 
Chief Justice Marshall in Burr's Trial, Robertson's 
Rep. 1,243 in overruling the government contention that 
a witness can never refuse to answer any question unless 
that particular answer, standing by itself, would ac-
knowledge the commission of the crime stated : 
"This would be rendering the rule almost 
worthless, many links frequently compose that 
chain of testimony which is necessary to convict 
any individual of a crime. It appears to the 
Court to be the true sense of the rule, that no 
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witness he compellable to furnish any one of them 
against himself. It is certainly not only a possible, 
but a pro ba:ble case, that a witness by disclosing 
a single f.act may complete the testimony against 
himself!" 
Clearly the witness is not to be the S'ole determiner 
of the existence of the privilege and can not arbitrarily 
refuse to testify. There must in fact be a real danger 
that the answer would have a tendency to be incriminat-
in~ and the trial court must determine if such real danger 
exists and if the witness swears under oath that the 
answer might tend to incriminate him, he should be al-
lowed great latitude and the court should sustain his 
claim unless it is clear that the answer could have no 
tendency to incriminate. Applvcation of Lewitt, 174 
C.A. 2nd 535, 345 P 2nd 75 (1959). Further, in making 
this determin.a tion the trial court is not bound by the 
formal record, but should construe the questions ad-
dressed to the witness in the light of the setting in which 
the questions were asked and the court should be gov-
erned as much by the personal perceptions of the pecu-
liarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence. 
Cohen v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 172 C. 
A 2nd 61. 343 P 2nd 286. ( 1959). 
Thus, under the l.aw as above indicated, the witness, 
LaR.ae Peterson, had the legal right to claim the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. However, if this court 
fe·els that the question put does not permit the witness 
to claim the privilege, then the question must then be 
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decided as to whether the question propounded "tends" 
to "degrade" the witness's character (Utah Gode Anno-
tated (amended in 1953) (Supra). This alternate quali-
fi('<l privilege must be afforded to the witness unless 
question is "to the very fact in issue or to a fact from 
whieh the fact in issue would be presumed." Utah Code 
Annotated, Supra. 
In the main case, Miss Jean Sinclair was charged 
with murder in the first degree, not "homosexual acts" 
and consequently, the question put could not be con-
sidered as going to the very faet in issue. Further, the 
question could not be considered as going to a f.act from 
which the fac.t in issue would be presumed. "Homose:xual 
acts" could in no way be any fact from which the fact of 
murder could be presumed. Nor is it within the purport 
of the statute to say that "homosexual acts" is a fact 
from which the motive to kill may he presumed. Cer-
tainly, motive is fact which may be probative to establish 
the identity of the actor, however, any evidence of motive 
must be sufficiently connected with crime as. to cre,ate· the 
inference that the actor possessed the desire to kill at the 
time of killing. In the case in point, the question bore no 
relationship as to time or place as to ma:ke the inquiry 
relevant or pertinent to the es!tablishment of any £act 
going to motive. The question was general and with no 
foundation as to time, it cannot be considered relevant 
and was made with no other purpose than to degrade the 
~haracter of the witness. 
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The lower court clearly erred in finding the wtness, 
LaRae Peterson, for contempt in her refusal to answer 
the question put to her -as to her "homose~ual acts." 
The appellant respectfully submits that this court re-
verse the lower court's finding. 
Respeefully submitted, 
JIMI MlT'SUNAGA 
MITS.UNAGA & ROSS 
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